Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

Research Summary

q       The study stems from the fact that during the Operation Iraqi freedom (OIF), the Iraqi resistance to coalition forces was very week that the forces could take down Saddam’s regime in less than three week’s time with very few casualties.

q       Drawing information from the interviews with Iraqi military and civil officials, the study notes down why the coalition forces had to fight very little besides the Iraqi leaders not presenting a strong resistance.

q       The issues detailed in the study are Saddam’s misjudgments and preoccupation with internal threats, the poorly executed Iraqi military operations, the weak motivation and morale among the military personnel, and the superior combat capability of the Coalition forces.

q       The study observes that Saddam’s decision making was seriously flawed during OIF including on several earlier occasions. With a limited grasp of international and military affairs, and overweening self-confidence, Saddam could do little to combat the coalition forces.

q       A significant portion of the study notes that Saddam’s personal security measures were extreme with weakened defense capacity against external attack.

q       The most important reasons for the weak resistance were the poorly designed military strategies of Iraq in addition to poor motivation and morale that undermined the capabilities of the Iraqi army.

q       On the other hand, the superior military capabilities could effectively boost up the performance of the coalition forces, placing them at a greater advantage than the Iraqi forces.

q       The study derives certain significant pointers towards the appropriate lessons for decision makers from OIF, how OIF paved the way for the insurgency that has followed in Iraq, and how OIF may influence the behavior of future United States adversaries.

q       Though the conditions during OIF favored the success of coalition at a low cost, the study indicates certain valuable lessons from the operations that would equip the US to face future adversaries.

q       With several insights into the background of military operations and resistance, the study is highly significant for the use of military and civilian officials concerned with the design and execution of U.S. operations to deter and counter threats to U.S. interests from enemy regimes and other hostile actors.

Read the full report

Back to Islamic / Arab Research Reports